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These examples underscore the challenges
involved in postmodern military missions,
and they may support the arguments of
those who believe it is dangerous, if not
impossible, to expect war-fighting troops
to conduct “other than war” missions.
The limitation of this collection of essays
is that it does not address the militaries
of greatest interest to American military
officers—those of potential adversaries to
the United States. Because the editors are
specifically proposing a theoretical model
of how Western, democratic militaries are
adjusting to a world with a dramatically
reduced conventional threat, the reader
must look elsewhere to discover whether
or not such nations as China are experi-
encing the same trends.
Yet there is a great deal here to challenge
those worried about the state of America’s
military today, especially concerning social
issues. One of the most interesting insights
concerns the levels of integration of
women and homosexuals in the American
military, compared with the other countries
surveyed. The case studies show that the
United States is farther along than most
in integrating women but lags behind the
postmodern norm in allowing open ho-
mosexuals into its ranks.
The essay on Israel, for example, points
out that the common perception of the
“woman warrior” in the Israeli Defense
Force is a myth. Although many women
played active fighting roles in the Israeli
war of independence, women today are
less fully integrated into the IDF than in
most other Western militaries.
On the subject of homosexuals, the success
of Canada is cited as a possible guide for
other nations. Homosexuals have been
able to serve openly in the Canadian Forces
since 1992, and the removal of previous
restrictions is described as having had
“virtually no negative impact” on such
matters as recruitment, retention, and
morale. It is not clear if the Canadian ex-
perience is directly applicable to the United
States, but the book suggests that perhaps
it is. One of the editors writes that “if the
full acceptance of openly homosexual service
members is only a matter of time, given the
increased tolerance for diversity of sexual
orientation among the general population,
it would be advisable for policy makers in
countries where this is true to move beyond
wishful thinking or abhorrence and con-
sider how such a transition can be made
with minimal negative impact on group
cohesion and military effectiveness.”
Of course, case studies from other coun-
tries may do little to persuade those who
have already made up their minds. The
decision of Canadian Forces authorities
in 1998 to approve financial support for
a service member’s sex-change opera-
tion, for example, may provide ammu-
nition for both sides in that particular
debate. Whether or not the Canadian
example is one to be feared or ap-
plauded, it does suggest how important
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Ah, ecstasy! A benign world for the next
two decades. Power politics disappear.
America leads the drawdown, with Russia
following to achieve parity with China,
Britain, and France at about two hundred
nuclear weapons. Worldwide nuclear
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verification becomes practically perfect.
Permanent members of the UN Security
Council agreeably limit their vetoes. It is
all here in this book, the product of the
“Deep Cuts Study Group.”
The authors make no secret of their ad-
vocacy for drastic nuclear weapons re-
ductions by the United States and Rus-
sia, the dealerting or deactivating of all
weapons to preclude launch on warning,
and announcements of no-first-use poli-
cies. The thesis depends on extraordinary
verification beyond today’s technology,
open sharing of weapons storage data,
ironclad control of fissile material, and
an effective worldwide security system.
An actual nuclear war with Russia is
considered unthinkable, despite signifi-
cant nuclear capability in that country;
although Russia now makes no bones
about its dependence on nuclear weap-
ons, the authors believe intentions can
change. The authors reject nuclear su-
premacy and deterrence for the un-
known of utopian equality.
On the other hand, this book espouses a
number of valid premises. “Military and
political objectives should be achieved
without use of nuclear weapons, if at all
possible.” The Russian early-warning sys-
tem has deteriorated since the breakup of
the Soviet Union (hence recent U.S.
overtures to share data). Any national
missile defense system must be tested ex-
tensively against a host of decoys before
the United States can certify its technical
effectiveness. As a result of conventional
weaknesses, Russia has placed great reli-
ance on nuclear weapons in its military
strategy. The Russian government has
been unable to negotiate effectively on
the issue during the past few years; signif-
icant problems remain in the transpar-
ency of weapons systems between Russia
and the United States, and fissile material
stockpiles are hard to verify.
However, if you are looking for a balanced
blueprint for the sizing, alert status, and
verification of nuclear forces during the
next two decades, you will not find it
here. There are several bothersome as-
pects. The authors cite Article VI of the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and
chide the nuclear powers for failure to
pursue more rapid reductions despite
enormous changes in the 1990s. Except
for one footnote on page 34, the authors
fail to address the full provisions of
Article VI, which calls for not only “ces-
sation of the nuclear arms race at an early
date and . . . nuclear disarmament” but
also “a treaty on general and complete
disarmament under strict and effective
international control.” With interna-
tional initiatives not in fact leading to
“general and complete disarmament,”
and with potential aggressors armed as
they are today, the nuclear nations have
no incentive to seek the reductions
envisioned.
The authors place great stress on the
premise that Russian command and con-
trol has dangerously deteriorated. In fact,
the system seems to have functioned the
way it was designed in the incident of the
1995 rocket launch from northern Nor-
way. Assertions by the Russian defense
minister indicate this fear is groundless.
A “no first use” declaration concerning
nuclear weapons by the United States is
not in its national interest. The United
States reacts to specific circumstances. It
need not specify how it would respond to
aggression, particularly involving weapons
of mass destruction. Aggressors should
realize that the United States considers
nuclear weapons an absolute last resort,
but aggressors should not be certain how
the nation will respond, or be offered a
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protective declaratory policy. Current
U.S. security assurances, including the “no
first use” negative-security assurance of
1978 concerning the Non-Proliferation
Treaty, serve its interests well.
Low numbers of nuclear weapons would
affect the international security environ-
ment and American presidential policies.
First, a limit of two hundred nuclear
weapons almost certainly would necessi-
tate targeting population centers rather
than military facilities. Such a strategy vio-
lates international law. Second, the United
States must understand the impact such a
reduction would have on allies to whom it
extends nuclear protection. These countries
can and likely would develop nuclear weap-
ons on their own; proliferation as a result
of destroyed confidence in American nu-
clear deterrence is not in the nation’s best
interest. Third, other powers may conclude
that they can and should make the invest-
ment in nuclear weapons to match the
United States. Today, they have little
chance of succeeding.
The authors harp on the “hair trigger”
readiness (alert) status of U.S. nuclear
weapons without explanation that
launch on warning is only one presiden-
tial option. The United States has al-
ready removed strategic bombers and
dual-capable aircraft from alert,
detargeted ballistic missiles, removed
nuclear capability from carriers and sur-
face ships, and improved technical
means to ensure against unauthorized
firing or use of nuclear weapons. Russia
has taken similar measures to dealert se-
lected forces. However, none of these
measures are unequivocally verifiable.
There are no magic wands for foolproof
verification. Moreover, in a dealerted
world, a crisis could trigger the most
precipitous, dangerous arms race to
realert that the world has ever
seen—highly destabilizing and poten-
tially disastrous.
Finally, the real issue is not just numbers
of nuclear weapons, “no first use,” alert
status, or verification but the preservation
of the peace between international entities
that might resort to warfare if the calculus
did not involve nuclear weapons. From
1600 to 1945, wartime casualties of civil-
ian and military personnel generally var-
ied between 1 to 2 percent of the world’s
population (2.6 percent in World War II).
After 1945 the casualty percentage
dropped significantly, and since about
1953 has consistently remained near 0.1
percent. Nuclear weapons have been a key
aspect of the preservation of peace be-
tween superpowers for the last five de-
cades. The United States must fully
understand the impact on American lead-
ership of any new arrangement before it
trashes what has proven to benefit world
democracy and freedom.
HANK CHILES
Admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret.)
U.S. Naval Academy
Gray, Colin S., The Second Nuclear Age. Boulder,
Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1999. 193pp. $45
Readers of Colin Gray’s earlier works
will not be disappointed by this new
book, nor will his critics be surprised by
his conclusions.
Gray argues that the end of the Cold War
does not mean that nuclear weapons can
be eliminated or forgotten. This book is
indeed valuable for noting, and taking to
task, the wide variety of academic trends
and fashions that have drawn such opti-
mistic conclusions since the collapse of
the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union.
Gray ably points to the many ways in
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